

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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O P 081300 Z MAY 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1971

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0179

EXDIS/ SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON' S STATEMENT OF MAY 8, 1973

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON  
AT THE MAY 8, 1973 SALT MEETING.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON  
MAY 8. 1973

MR. MINISTER,

I

THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF OUR WORK AT GENEVA, AS I  
BELIEVE BOTH SIDES AGREE, IS THE REPLACEMENT OF THE INTERIM  
AGREEMENT WITH A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OF-  
FENSIVE ARMS. DURING THE RECENT RECESS, THE UNITED STATES  
REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF OUR PAST WORK AND CAREFULLY EXAMINED  
THE POSSIBILITIES NOW AVAILABLE TO US TO ADVANCE OUR WORK.

THIS EXAMINATION BY THE US SIDE REAFFIRMED OUR CONVICTION  
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THAT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT MUST PROVIDE FOR ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE, ON AN ENDURING BASIS, OF THE FORCES THAT COMPRISE THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS -- THE ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS, AND THE HEAVY BOMBERS. I HAVE EMPHASIZED IN THE PAST, AND EMPHASIZE AGAIN, THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE US ATTACHES TO THE CONCEPT OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN CENTRAL SYSTEMS. WITHOUT AN EVEN- HANDED APPROACH TO LIMITATION OF THESE PRIMARY COMPONENTS OF OUR RESPECTIVE STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES, OUR WORK CANNOT REACH A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. WITH ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH AN APPROACH, HOWEVER, THE WAY IS OPEN TO PROGRESS ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF QUESTIONS BEFORE US.

## II

WITH THIS REQUIREMENT AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE, I WILL SET FORTH TODAY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS RELATED TO LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. I BELIEVE THESE PROPOSALS PROVIDE A SOUND BASIS FOR CONSTRUCTING A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS IS CLEARLY ONE OF THE SIGNIFICANT MEASURES OF THE STRATEGIC CAPABILITY OF EACH SIDE. ACCORDINGLY, THE US DELEGATION HAS STRESSED IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING A CEILING ON THIS AGGREGATE NUMBER WHICH WOULD BE EQUAL FOR THE TWO SIDES. THIS CEILING WOULD CONSTITUTE AN UPPER LIMIT ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD BE PERMITTED TO HAVE AS OF AN AGREED DATE.

THE US IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN AGGREGATE CEILING FOR EACH SIDE OF 2350 ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS. THE CEILING OF 2350 REPRESENTS A REALISTIC LEVEL TO WHICH EACH SIDE CAN ADAPT WITHOUT A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN ITS CURRENT DEPLOYMENTS.

EACH SIDE MAY DESIRE TO CHANGE THE MIX OF ITS ICBM, SLBM, AND HEAVY BOMBER FORCES AS ITS PERCEIVED STRATEGIC NEEDS CHANGE OVER TIME. IN ORDER TO ALLOW FOR FLEXIBILITY IN THE COMPOSITION OF THESE SYSTEMS, THE US PROPOSES THAT THE AGREEMENT PERMIT, SUBJECT TO THE OVERALL LIMITATION ON THE  
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AGGREGATE NUMBER OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS, THE SUBSTITUTION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS FOR ICBM LAUNCHERS, AND THE SUBSTITUTION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS FOR ONE ANOTHER, AS WELL. IT IS THE US VIEW THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT ALLOW ANY INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS BY SUBSTITUTING THEM FOR SLBM LAUNCHERS OR HEAVY BOMBERS.

IN THE CONTEXT OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE AND STRATEGIC  
STABILITY, LIMITATION OF ICBM THROW- WEIGHT IS IMPORTANT TO OUR  
CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. OVER THE TIME PERIOD OF A PERMANENT  
AGREEMENT, A NUMERICAL LIMIT ON ICBM LAUNCHERS, EVE  
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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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FM USDEL SALT TWO II  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1972  
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0179

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### III

IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT ON THE FOREGOING PROPOSALS, THE  
UNITED STATES WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER CERTAIN OTHER  
LIMITATIONS IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

-- FIRST, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER  
QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC  
MISSILE FORCES.

-- ADDITIONALLY, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO  
CONSIDER A BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, PRODUCTION  
AND DEPLOYMENT OF:

(1) AIR- TO- SURFACE MISSILES WITH A MAXIMUM RANGE GREATER  
THAN 3000 KILOMETERS;

(2) CRUISE MISSILES OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE;

(3) STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES  
OTHER THAN SUBMARINES; AND

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(4) FIXED AND MOBILE DEVICES FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC MISSILES WHICH COULD BE EMPLACED ON THE SEABED OR OCEAN FLOOR OR IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND INTERNAL WATERS.

I HAVE PROPOSED TODAY CONSIDERATION OF AN INITIAL AGGREGATE CEILING OF 2350 AS A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC GOAL IN THE PRESENT STATE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE CONTEXT OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE UNITED STATES WOULD ALSO BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A PROGRAM FOR ACHIEVING SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS IN THE CEILINGS ON CENTRAL STRATEGIC FORCES FROM THE INITIALLY AGREED LEVELS.

IV

MR. MINISTER, THE UNITED STATES POSITION WHICH I HAVE SET FORTH TODAY HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AFTER THE MOST THOROUGH STUDY. I LOOK FORWARD TO IT BEING GIVEN THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION BY YOUR DELEGATION AND BY YOUR GOVERNMENT. JOHNSON

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